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Abstract
We propose an econometric analysis of the evolution of bank credit to the private sector 
in order to describe credit cycles and identify phases of particularly low (or negative) credit 
growth such as those that typically accompany fi nancial or banking crises. We use a sample 
of twelve developed countries, which improves the reliability of our estimation results and 
provides a global view of the situation of credit for developed countries. In our preferred 
specifi cation, the credit cycle is characterized as a three-state Markov-switching model that 
identifi es episodes of credit expansion, intermediate credit growth and subpar growth or 
credit crisis. This specifi cation identifi es six of the countries as having experienced period 
of credit adjustment after the beginning of the fi nancial crisis in 2007 (Canada, Germany, 
Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and US). By the end of the sample period, credit growth 
was still impaired in three of these countries (Germany and Spain in 2010:I; and United 
States in 2009:IV). The analysis also uncovers a systematic cyclical pattern in the bank 
lending sector of the group of advanced countries considered in our sample, which have 
experienced fi ve episodes of synchronous restrictions in bank lending: 1974-75, 1980-82, 
1991-93, 2001-02 and from 2008 to the end of the sample.
Keywords: Credit cycle, banking crisis, fi nancial crisis, Markov, business cycle.
JEL classifi cation: E44; E51; G01; G21.
Resumen
En este estudio se propone un análisis econométrico de la evolución del crédito bancario al 
sector privado con el objetivo de describir los ciclos de crédito e identifi car, por ejemplo, las 
fases de crecimiento anormalmente bajo, como las que suelen asociarse con episodios de 
crisis fi nanciera o bancaria. En el trabajo se emplea una muestra de doce países desarrollados 
lo cual permite una visión global de la situación del crédito en las economías avanzadas y 
mejora las propiedades estadísticas de la estimación. Los resultados sugieren que la mejor 
descripción del ciclo de crédito se realizaría mediante un modelo de Markov de regímenes 
cambiantes que tuviese tres estados (expansión, crecimiento intermedio y contracción del 
crédito). Bajo esta especifi cación, seis países de la muestra se encontrarían en un episodio 
de ajuste o contracción del crecimiento del crédito tras el inicio de la crisis fi nanciera en 2007 
(Alemania, Canadá, España, Estados Unidos, Holanda y Suiza). Respecto al último período 
considerado, el crecimiento del crédito continuaría en ese estadio en tres de esos países 
(Alemania, España y Estados Unidos). Además, los resultados aportan evidencia sobre la 
existencia de un patrón cíclico sistemático en el crecimiento del crédito para el grupo de 
países considerado, identifi cando cinco episodios de restricciones sincronizadas en el crédito 
bancario: 1974-75, 1980-82, 1991-93, 2001-02 y desde 2008 al fi nal de la muestra.
Palabras claves: Ciclo de crédito, crisis bancaria, crisis fi nanciera, Markov, ciclo económico.
Códigos JEL: E44; E51; G01; G21.
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1 Introduction
Real credit growth fluctuates over time, following a boom-bust pattern. There is a strand of the
literature that has found evidence about the cyclical pattern of credit. For example, Schularick
and Taylor (2009) suggest the existence of boom-bust episodes for the credit cycle, arguing
that credit growth contains valuable information about the likelihood of future financial crises.
Several empirical studies have centered on the identification of changes in bank credit allocation
and episodes of severe restrictions in bank lending, sometimes called “credit crunches,” that
coincide with banking crisis episodes. This strand of the literature is mostly based on case
studies and econometric analysis are few. In this context, we propose a nonlinear model for
the evolution of real credit growth as an attempt to achieve an objective identification of credit
cycle dynamics. The main target of this paper is to describe credit cycles and identify phases
of particularly low (or negative) credit growth such as those that typically accompany financial
crises.
We model the evolution of the quarterly growth rate of real bank credit to the private sector
as a Markov-switching process using the methodology proposed by Hamilton (1989) for a sample
that includes the countries that the OECD describes as G10 plus Spain over the period 1960:I-
2010:I. G10 countries in the OECD grouping are Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. In particular,
credit dynamics are modeled as a combination of a country-specific component and a cyclical
component following the multi-country approach proposed by Ceron and Suarez (2006). In this
study we focus on the evolution of the cyclical component by specifying the non-linear structure
over the standardized series of real credit growth. There are two advantages of using this
multi-country approach: it provides a broad view of the situation of credit for these developed
economies, and it helps to increase the reliability of the estimates for the parameters of the
model (specially when the time series dimension of the panel may be too short, and the number
of switches too small, compared to the average duration of credit phases1).
First, we propose the estimation of the model with two latent states in which the expected
duration of credit crises as defined by this model and the mean growth rates obtained suggest
1 Estimation results evidence that the expected duration of each cyclical phase tends to last more than two
years.
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that the pattern that this model captures is more related to rather long phases of high and lows
in real credit growth more that credit booms and busts. Following this reasoning, we consider
the estimation of a restricted version of the model with two states, in which we impose the value
of the mean growth rate for the credit crisis state in the estimation. This exercise represents an
intermediate stage prior to the estimation of the model with three states, which is our preferred
specification of the model. Finally, in order to filter out the effect of GDP growth on the credit
cycle, we consider the estimation of the models with two and three states including lagged GDP
growth as an explanatory variable for the mean growth rate of real credit growth.
After considering this range of models, we find that the credit cycle can be best described
through a three-state Markov-switching model in which, as a matter of convention, sit = 1
identifies a “credit expansion” state, sit = 2 an “intermediate growth” state, and sit = 3 a “credit
crisis” state. Credit crisis phases have a mean growth rate of −121.2% of one standard deviation
of the original series and they are found to be the least persistent state, with an expected duration
of 7.4 quarters and an unconditional probability of 18.1%. Credit expansion phases have a mean
growth rate of 80.8% and they last around 13.0 quarters with an unconditional probability
of 37.1%. Intermediate growth phases have a mean growth rate of −18.5% of one standard
deviation of the original series with and expected duration of 7.4 quarters and a frequency of
44.8%.
With respect to the enlarged version of these models, that is, the one in which lagged GDP
growth is included as an explanatory variable for the mean of real credit growth, the effect of
this variable reflects a positive but quantitatively small effect of the evolution of real economic
activity (as measured by GDP growth) on the developments in bank credit to the private sector.2
The preferred version of the model identifies six of the countries as having experienced a credit
crisis episode after the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007 (Canada, Germany, Netherlands,
2In an attempt to capture possible ruptures in the dynamics of both real credit growth and economic growth,
as well as any possible feedback from credit growth to GDP growth, we tried an alternative specification in which
we included GDP growth as a second endogenous variable in a vector autoregressive (VAR) context. It turned out
that the results obtained from the estimation of the Markov-Switching vector autoregressive model (MS-VAR)
relative to the identification of credit crisis phases were almost the same as in the univariate version. Because of
the little contribution of GDP growth to disentangle credit crisis phases, and because the model was not able to
improve the goodness-of-fit for real output growth relative to the univariate version proposed by other authors
(in terms of the mean squared error obtained using each model), we decided to skip the details on the results
obtained with this specification.
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Spain, Switzerland and US). By the end of the sample period, three of these countries were
still in a credit crisis episode (Germany and Spain in 2010:I; and United States in 2009:IV).
Comparisons between the evolution of the smoothed probability of being in a credit crisis and
the credit standards required by commercial banks suggest that the latter lead the credit cycle for
the case of the United States (and also for the case of the Euro Area, although the result is much
less definitive due to the heterogeneity present among euro area countries). This coincides with
the results found with other methodologies (e.g., Lown and Morgan, 2006) about the validity of
credit standard surveys as a form of leading indicators for the credit cycle.
Our proposal helps to clarify the analysis of the situation of credit at the international level,
since we are able to study the evolution of the probabilities of being in a credit crisis for all of
the countries in our sample as a by-product of the estimation. We propose the construction of a
synthetic indicator of global credit stance that can be interpreted as a measure of the evolution
of the credit cycle in the advanced economies. Figure 1 plots the evolution of the average of
the quarterly growth rate of real bank credit to the private sector (BCPS) for the countries
considered in the study (left axis) and, anticipating the results shown below, the proposed
synthetic indicator of global credit stance (right axis).3 Looking at the raw data one can realize
that there is a cyclical pattern in bank lending, however it is difficult to determine exactly what
are the turning points since it sometimes shows a volatile behavior and periods of synchronized
credit crisis among these countries. Our indicator includes information of the probability of
being in a credit crisis for all the countries in our sample, and signals five episodes of global
restrictions in bank lending over the last forty years: 1974-76, 1979-84, 1989-94, 2001-02, and
from 2008 until the end of the period.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the literature,
both from an empirical and from a theoretical perspective. Section 3 describes the data and
the methodology used in the empirical exercise. Section 4 presents the estimation results of
the proposed models for real credit growth and an analysis of these results at the country-level.
Section 5 contains an application of the results obtained from the estimation of our preferred
specification. Section 6 concludes.
3 The proposed indicator excludes data for Canada since the series for this country was only available until
2008:IV.
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Figure 1: Evolution of bank lending
- Synthetic Indicator (right axis) - - Average of real BCPS growth rates (left axis)
2 Literature Review
Several empirical studies have centered on the identification of periods of credit crisis that
coincide with banking crisis episodes. Most of these works consist of case studies that are based
on the evolution of variables related to developments in the financial sector and economic activity,
giving rise to a set of banking crisis databases. Laeven et al. (2007) represents an example of
this approach: They propose a database that covers the universe of systemic banking crises
for the period 1970-2007 (extending the database provided by Caprio et al, 2005). Systemic
banking crises are identified under some requirements that combine quantitative data with some
subjective assessment of the situation. Bordo et al. (2001) provide a database of financial,
currency and banking crises. They consider that an episode qualifies as a banking crisis when
they observe financial distress resulting in the erosion of most or all aggregate banking system
capital. This criterion is the same as the one followed by Carpio and Klingebiel (2003), who
propose a survey of episodes of systemic and borderline financial crises for 93 countries. Reinhart
and Rogoff (2008a, 2008b) provide a comprehensive database of banking crises for high and
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middle-to-low income countries. Banking crises are identified through the analysis of events,
marking a crisis episode whenever: (1) bank runs lead to the closure, merging, or takeover by
the public sector of one or more financial institutions; and (2) the closure, merging, takeover, or
large-scale government assistance of an important financial institution that marks the start of a
string of similar outcomes for other financial institutions.
Another strand of the literature has centered on the analysis of the developments in the
financial and banking sector prior and during credit crisis episodes. These studies have found
a link between rapid credit growth and banking system fragility. For example, Kaminsky and
Reinhart (1999) analyze episodes of banking and currency crises following the evolution of a set
of macroeconomic indicators. They find that the growth rate of bank credit to the private sector
accelerates as banking crises approach, remaining above the growth rate recorded in tranquil
times. This finding is indicative of how bank credit can signal the upcoming of a crisis episode
evolving as a leading indicator. Nevertheless, it is important to be aware of the fact that not
always a period of rapid expansion in bank credit signals an overheating or a possible future
banking crisis. For example, Cotarelli, Del’Ariccia and Vladkova-Hollar (2003) claim for a more
positive assessment of credit booms following the literature that emphasizes the link between
financial development and growth. They find that the acceleration in real bank credit in Central
and Eastern European countries during 1998-2002 reflect overall financial deepening, the speed
of privatization, crowding-in forces, and overall progress toward market institutions.
Regarding to the theoretical literature, some authors have proposed theoretical models as
an attempt to explain the mechanisms that generate fluctuations in bank credit growth. Gorton
and He (2005) support that credit cycles or periodic “credit crunches” are a result of changes in
bank beliefs based on public information. Banks compete with each other relative to the credit
standards that they apply and private information about prospective borrowers produced by a
bank can affect rival lenders due to a“winner’s curse” effect. Some studies propose the existence
of a link between the credit cycle and banking crises. Most of these models incorporate the
“financial accelerator” as a common explanation of this linkage (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989
and 1990, or Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). Inflated collateral values lead to a relaxation in the
borrower’s credit constraint and contribute to excessively rapid credit growth. When business
conditions worsen, borrowers’ net worth gets reduced, while increases agency costs for the banks.
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As the worthiness of borrowers gets reduced fewer loans are made, generating a credit crunch
that leads to a contraction in investment with negative effects on the real economy. There
are also some proposals that link the credit cycle with the business cycle (which ultimately
has consequences on the evolution of the banking sector). Rajan (1994) provides a theory of
fluctuations in bank policies, arguing that rational bank managers with short horizons will set
credit policies that influence and are influenced by other banks and demand side conditions.
These fluctuations affect the evolution of credit, leading to a theory of low frequency business
cycles driven by bank credit policies.4
3 Data and methodology
The main goal of this paper is to describe credit cycles and identify phases of particularly low
(or negative) growth such as those that typically accompany financial or banking crises. We
model the evolution of the quarterly growth rate of real bank credit to the private sector as a
Markov-switching process using the methodology proposed by Hamilton (1989), considering an
unbalanced panel of twelve advanced countries (those in the OECD G10 group plus Spain), over
the period 1960:I-2010:I.
In this section we first present a brief description of the data used in the empirical exercise.
Then, we present the basic Markov-switching autoregressive model for the standardized series
of real credit growth, with which we intend to capture the evolution of the cyclical component
of the dynamics of credit. We also present the specification of an enlarged version of the basic
model, in which the mean of the process is also explained by the evolution of lagged GDP growth.
This specification implies a new definition of the credit cycle, as the basis of which we extract
the effect of the business cycle on swings in bank lending.
3.1 The Data
We use quarterly data for a sample that includes those countries belonging to the OECD G10
countries plus Spain (G10 countries in the OECD grouping are Belgium, Canada, France, Ger-
4 Gorton and Winton (2003) provide a detailed and extended review of the literature about the effect of bank
funding on lending and the consequences on the business cycle.
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many, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States), for
the period 1960:I-2010:I from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). Our variable of interest is the quarterly growth rate of real bank credit
to the private sector, constructed using data on net credit extended by the banking sector to
non-financial corporations, households, and non-profit institutions deflated by the GDP defla-
tor. Real output growth is also used in some specifications of the model and it is defined as
the quarterly growth rate of real GDP, obtained from the quarterly country series of the OECD
Economic Outlook.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics: quarterly growth rate of real credit
(quarterly percentage rates)
# Obs. Sample period Mean S.D. Max Min
Belgium 200 1960:II - 2010:I 1.37 1.96 -2.77 6.51
Canada 195 1960:II - 2008:IV 1.45 1.98 -7.99 7.81
France 200 1960:II - 2010:I 1.34 1.82 -5.04 7.79
Germany 200 1960:II - 2010:I 1.07 0.92 -1.11 3.06
Italy 160 1970:II - 2010:I 0.91 1.34 -3.75 3.42
Japan 199 1960:II - 2009:IV 1.26 1.77 -4.99 7.62
Netherlands 200 1960:II - 2010:I 1.98 1.44 -1.30 6.50
Spain 152 1972:II - 2010:I 1.62 1.91 -3.03 7.28
Sweden 200 1960:II - 2010:I 0.92 2.45 -7.81 7.96
Switzerland 184 1964:II - 2010:I 0.90 1.22 -3.68 4.33
UK 200 1960:II - 2010:I 1.08 2.06 -5.96 5.92
US 200 1960:II - 2009:IV 0.86 1.43 -4.47 3.96
S.D.: Standard Deviation. # Number of observations.
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics for real credit growth. There exists heterogeneity
in the mean growth rates, ranging from values close to 0.90% for countries like Italy, Sweden
or Switzerland, to values close to 2.00% as for Netherlands. There is also come cross-country
heterogeneity related to the standard deviation of these series. There are countries with levels of
dispersion higher than 2.00%, like the United Kingdom or Sweden, while other countries show a
more stable pattern with standard deviations below 1.50%, like Germany or Switzerland. Some
of the countries have experienced episodes of rapid expansion of real credit in just one quarter
with rates of growth larger than 7%, like France, Japan, Spain or Sweden. Countries like Canada
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and also Sweden register the record levels at the other extreme, with episodes of falls in real
credit growth, with values close to −8.00%.
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 The basic Markov-switching autoregressive model
We assume that the basic autoregressive Markov-switching model (MS-AR) that describes the
evolution of real bank credit to the private sector (real credit growth henceforth), Δcit, at the
country level can be specified as:
Δcit = ωi(sit) + φ(Δcit−1 − ωi(sit−1)) + σiit, (1)
it ∼ iidN(0, 1),
where φ is an autoregressive coefficient, μ(·) is a state-contingent mean, σ2i is the variance of the
residuals, and sit is the latent variable describing the state of the economy in country i = 1, ..., N
at period t = 1, ..., T . This variable is assumed to follow a Markov chain {sit}Tt=1 with S latent
states, sit  1, ..., S, and transition probabilities, pkj , defined as:
pkj ≡ P (sit = j|sit−1 = k),
S∑
j=1
pkj = 1 ∀k  {1, ..., S},
for j = 1, ..., S. In the analysis below, we will explore specifications of this basic model in which
the latent state variable displays two (S = 2) and three states (S = 3).
We adopt a multi-country estimation approach following the strategy proposed by Ceron
and Suarez (2006). The reason for this strategy is that there might be reliability problems with
the estimates that are obtained using data for a single country, especially when the phases of
the cycle that one is considering are long and the number of switches between states within the
time series considered may be too small. However, the existence of unobserved heterogeneity
between the economies and banking sectors of these countries may generate an identification
problem, since the evolution of the latent state variable may capture permanent differences in real
credit growth more than movements related to changes in regime. The proposed methodology
addresses this identification problem by modeling the dynamics of our variable of interest as a
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combination of a country-specific component, which is intended to capture unobservable cross-
country heterogeneity, and a cyclical component, which could be modeled as a Markov-switching
process with parameters common to all the countries.
In particular, we assume that the state contingent mean of the process is described as follows:
ωi(sit) = αi + μ(sit) · σi, (2)
where αi and σ
2
i are identified as the unconditional mean and variance of real credit growth
(which are country-specific and intended to capture unobserved heterogeneity) by assuming
that the expectation of the cyclical component equals zero, that is:
E[μ(sit)] = 0,∀i. (3)
Provided that the model presented in (1) coincides with the true data generating process for
real credit growth, and assuming that (2) and (3) hold, permanent unobserved heterogeneity
may be controlled by using the standardized transformation, Δdit, of real credit growth, Δcit,
in the estimation of the Markov process for the cyclical part:
Δdit =
Δcit − αi
σi
. (4)
We could also rewrite the specification of the basic model as follows:
Δdit = μ(sit) + φ(Δdit−1 − μ(sit−1)) + σit, (5)
it ∼ iidN(0, 1),
where the parameters of the MS process are assumed to be the same for all the standardized
series, so that the transition probabilities are the same for all countries (pij = pj). It should be
remarked that each country’s latent state variable is treated as an independent realization of the
same Markov-switching process, so that we are able to study the evolution of the probabilities
of being in a given state over time for each of the countries.
Under these assumptions, the parameters of the model are estimated by adapting the esti-
mation method proposed by Hamilton (1989) by considering as our objective function the sum
of the likelihoods of the countries in our sample. The sample counterpart of the unconditional
country-specific moments is used in order to obtain the standardized series. Here we proceed as
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if the number of observations was large enough in order to avoid bias problems related to the
presence of serial correlation in the data.
The period that we consider is large enough to contain some events related to structural
changes in the historical evolution of real credit. Non-linear models tend to capture these move-
ments as corner solutions in the estimation of the process. In a country-by-country approach,
these changes may obscure the identification of periods related to credit crises. We conjecture
that, by imposing the same Markov-switching structure on the cyclical component of all of the
countries, the latent state variable is less likely to capture structural changes, given that these
shifts tend to be less recursive than the phases related to real credit growth (Table A1 included
in the Appendix contains descriptive statistics of real credit growth for several decades; they do
not show remarkable changes in the mean growth rates of real credit growth for the different
subperiods).
3.2.2 The enlarged version of the MS-AR model
In addition to our basic model, we also consider a specification in which (one-period lagged) real
GDP growth affects the conditional mean of the credit growth’s process:
Δdit = μ(sit,Δgdpit−1) + φ (Δdit−1 − μ(sit−1,Δgdpit−2)) + it, (6)
where
μ(sit,Δgdpit−1) = μ(sit) + β(sit)Δgdpit−1
and the specification of it remains unchanged. In fact, this specification implies an alternative
definition of the credit cycle, in which cyclical shifts in the evolution of real credit growth
captured by the non-linear MS-AR structure are those not linearly “explained” by shifts in the
business cycle as captured by lagged GDP growth.
4 Estimation results
In this section, we report the results obtained from the estimation of the different specifications
of the Markov-switching model presented in Section 2.2 for the standardized series of real credit
growth, Δdit. First, we explain the criterium used to select our preferred specification of the
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model and comment on the parameter estimates obtained. Then, we explore the implications
of the results for the country-level cyclicality analyzing the evolution of real credit growth
through the probabilities of being in each of the possible states (obtained as a by-product of
the estimation), and the implied conditional moments for the original country series. Finally,
we briefly analyze the relationship of the bank credit cycle and the business cycle for the case
of US as an illustration.
4.1 Estimation results
Table 2 presents a classification of the different models that are considered in this study. First,
we focus on those specifications based on the basic MS-AR model specified in (5), which includes
data on real credit growth exclusively. Models 1 and 3 refer to the two and three states MS-AR
models respectively. Model 2 represents the basic model in which we impose the value of the
mean growth rate of the second state. Then we present the results obtained from the enlarged
version of the model specified in (6) with two and three latent states. This makes Models 4 and
5, respectively.
Table 2: Overview table
Basic MS-AR Enlarged MS-AR
Unrestricted Restricted
Two states Model 1 Model 2 Model 4
Three states Model 3 - Model 5
Table 3 summarizes our estimation results. These models are estimated including data
for all the countries in the sample after standardization using the sample counterparts of the
unconditional means and variances. The units of measure of the presented estimates are standard
deviations of the original country variable, both for the state-contingent means as well as for
the standard deviation of the process for the innovations.
Model 1 corresponds to the basic two-state (S = 2) MS-AR model described in (5). The
estimation uncovers two states that describe the evolution of real credit growth, which differ in
their value for the mean growth rate. The high (low) growth state is described by a mean growth
rate, μ(1) (μ(2)), equivalent to 58.6% (−72.1%) of one standard deviation of the original series.
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The autocorrelation parameter φ, which significantly differs from zero, reflects the effect one
period ahead of the deviation of the variable Δdit with respect to the state contingent mean. A
unit increase in this deviation has a positive effect on the following quarter, close to 30% of one
standard deviation of the original series. The high (low) growth state has an expected duration
of 19.2 (16.0) quarters and happens with an unconditional probability of 54.6% (45.4%).
A first view on the estimates obtained from Model 1, especially the expected durations of
the states that turn out to be very similar and are above 4 years in both cases, points out
that the cycle that it captures is more related to alternating phases of high and low credit
growth rather than to periods of normality alternated with periods of abnormal or severe credit
crunches, which is the main target of this paper. In order to improve the identification of
credit crisis episodes, we conduct an empirical investigation through the estimation of Model
2 in which we restrict the parameter of the low growth mean μ(2) to be equal to −1 standard
deviation. The point estimate for the high growth mean μ(1) is now 46.7%, lower than the
one obtained in the previous specification. This is an expected result since now the definition
of the second state is stricter compared to the previous model, so that the first state includes
periods of intermediate growth and credit expansions, while phases of credit crisis emerge as the
second state. The expected duration of the low growth state is now shorter, around three years,
while the high/intermediate growth state is now more persistent, being close to 5.5 years. The
unconditional probabilities show the same pattern since the unconditional probability of being
in a low growth state is smaller (35.1%), while episodes of high/intermediate growth happen
more usually (64.9%). Model 2 represents a shortcut in the identification of periods of severe
credit crunch that may be useful in those cases in which the econometrician is not interested
in the evolution of the latent state variable away from the crisis phases. The problems of the
restricted version of the model are that there is an important loss in the likelihood obtained
from the estimation and it is not capable to disentangle phases of expansion from phases of
intermediate credit growth. These disadvantages can be avoided through the specification of the
model with 3 states.
Model 3 corresponds to the MS-AR model with three states (S = 3) as it is specified in
(5). The description of this model is the same as the one presented in (2) where, as a matter
of convention, we expect sit = 1 to identify a “credit expansion” state, sit = 2 an “intermediate
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Table 3: Estimation results
(standard errors in parenthesis)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
μ(1) 0.586 0.467 0.808 0.586 0.803
(0.042) (0.037) (0.055) (0.041) (0.055)
μ(2) -0.721 -1.000 1 -0.185 -0.722 -0.201
(0.048) (0.063) (0.047) (0.063)
μ(3) - - -1.212 - -1.239
(0.075) (0.077)
φ 0.304 0.350 0.206 0.298 0.198
(0.025) (0.026) (0.034) (0.026) (0.035)
σ2 0.529 0.527 0.456 0.281 0.452
(0.019) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
p11 0.948 0.955 0.923 0.947 0.923
(0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.014)
p22 0.937 0.916 0.924 0.938 0.922
(0.010) (0.013) (0.016) (0.010) (0.016)
p33 - - 0.864 - 0.860
(0.011) (0.012)
p12 - - 0.045 - 0.047
(0.015) (0.015)
p21 - - 0.047 - 0.049
(0.011) (0.012)
p32 - - 0.095 - 0.100
(0.027) (0.028)
Δgdp−1 - - - 0.029 0.032
(0.017) (0.016)
Expected Duration
S1 19.2 22.1 13.0 19.0 13.0
S2 16.0 11.9 13.2 16.0 12.8
S3 - - 7.4 - 7.1
Unconditional Probabilities
S1 54.6 64.9 37.1 54.2 37.6
S2 45.4 35.1 44.8 45.8 44.9
S3 - - 18.1 - 17.6
AIC 1347.8 1371.7 1293.3 1348.7 1284.0
BIC 1382.2 1400.3 1356.4 1388.8 1352.7
Log-likelihood -667.9 -680.8 -635.7 -667.3 -630.0
1 Imposed value in the estimation. Note: μ(·) is a state-contingent mean; φ is an autoregressive
coefficient; σ2 is the variance of the residuals; pkj is the probability of shifting from state k to
state j; Δgdp−1 corresponds to the standardized quarterly growth rate of real GDP. AIC: Akaike’s
information criterion. BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion or Schwarz Criterion.
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growth” state, and sit = 3 a “credit crisis” state. Credit expansions display a mean growth rate,
μ(1), equal to 80.8% of one standard deviation of the original series while credit crisis phases
have a mean growth rate equal to −121.2%. Phases of intermediate growth are identified by the
middle state, that emerges with a mean growth rate of −18.5% of one standard deviation of the
original series. Credit crises emerge as the less persistent and frequent state with an expected
duration of 7.4 and an unconditional probability of being in this state of 18.1%. The expected
duration of intermediate growth and credit expansion phases is similar (close to 2 years and a
quarter), but intermediate growth phases are more frequent with an unconditional probability
of 44.8% compared to 37.1% of credit expansion episodes. The point estimates of the transition
probability matrix from Model 3 are:
⎡
⎣
p11 p21 p31
p12 p22 p32
p13 p23 p33
⎤
⎦ =
⎡
⎣
0.923 0.047 0.041
0.045 0.924 0.095
0.032 0.028 0.864
⎤
⎦ .
These estimates show that, once being in a credit crisis and given that the economy does
not remain in the same state in the next period, the most likely event is to observe a shift into
an intermediate growth episode, 9.5%, rather than into a credit expansion, 4.1%, pointing out
the fact that rapid recoveries are not usual in the credit cycle. The same event happens when
the banking sector is in a credit expansion, that is, given that it does not remain in a credit
expansion phase the banking sector of these economies tend to go into an intermediate growth
state (4.5%) rather than into a credit crisis (3.2%).
Model 3 achieves a richer and closer to intuition description of the “credit cycle” since it is
able to separately identify periods of high growth, intermediate growth and credit crunch. This
version is our preferred univariate specification within the models that just include real credit
growth, hence we will use the outcomes obtained from this estimation in order to perform a
deeper analysis. Relative to the selection of the number of states, in the context of Markov
switching models, the usual tests (Likelihood Ratio, Wald, and Lagrange multiplier) do not
have the standard asymptotic distribution because of the presence of nuisance parameters under
the null hypothesis. Nevertheless, we should remark that there is an important gain in the
likelihood obtained from this specification with respect to the model in which we allow for just
two states. The information criterions of Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz (BIC) suggest that there
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is a large enough increase in the goodness of fit obtained from the estimation of the three-state
Markov-switching model compared to the restricted version.
The last two columns correspond to the augmented models that include real output growth
as it is specified in (6). These models (Models 4 and 5) are estimated using the standardized
series of real GDP growth, thus the units of measure of the estimates should be interpreted as
deviations of the original country variable as in the previous cases. It is important to notice that
when we include lagged GDP growth as an explanatory variable of the mean growth rate of real
credit the latent definition of the “credit cycle” as captured by Markov-switching structure of
the model changes. The latent state variable now captures shifts in the evolution of real credit
growth after having discounted or filtered out the linear effect of the business cycle as captured
by Δgdpit−1. The specification in (6) allows the coefficient for Δgdpit−1 to vary across states,
nevertheless the non-reported estimation results confirm that the coefficient for Δgdpit−1 does
not significantly change with the latent state variable in neither Model 4 nor Model 5.
Model 4 stands for the enlarged version of Model 1, that is, the MS-AR model with two
states (S = 2) including lagged GDP growth as it is specified in (6). The estimated values
for the state-contingent means of the process, as well as the estimated transition probabilities
are similar to the ones obtained in the specification of the model without Δgdpit−1. Lagged
economic growth has a statistically non significant and quantitatively small positive effect on
the mean of real credit growth. The inclusion of this variable in the model with two states seems
to have little effect on the estimated non-linear structure for real credit growth.
Model 5 corresponds to the three-state version of the model including lagged GDP growth
as an explanatory variable for the mean of the process. The inclusion of Δgdpit−1 has again
a small effect on the estimates obtained. The difference between the estimated values for μ(·)
between Model 3 and Model 5 is relatively small. We should be aware of the fact that in Model
5 the mean growth rate of real credit growth is also determined by lagged GDP growth, but
Δgdpit−1 has zero mean (the model is estimated using the standardized series) so comparisons
are still meaningful. We also tried other specifications including different combinations of the
lags of Δgdpi, where the coefficients for these extra variables were not significative.
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Since the inclusion of lagged output growth does not improve the identification of credit
crisis phases, we will consider the analysis of the results obtained from the estimation of Model
3 henceforth, in which the credit cycle is fully determined by the swings in real credit growth.
4.2 Analysis of the results
The estimation of Markov-switching models gives us the opportunity to look at the probabilities
of being in each of the states over time and date the different phases of the credit cycle. The
dating is based on the selection of the more likely state through a comparison of the “smoothed
probabilities” of being in each of them, which are obtained following the procedure described
by Hamilton (1989). We consider that the economy is in state sit = j, (j = 1, 2, 3), whenever:
P (siτ = j|ΩiT ) > P (siτ = k|ΩiT ), ∀k = j,
where T refers to the full sample period, τ < T and ΩT contains the information until the last
period. The smoothed probabilities, also called two-sided probabilities, use the evolution of real
credit growth from the full sample period to estimate the probability of being in each state for
a given quarter, and hence they are more accurate in the dating than the filtered probabilities
that use only real time information.
Figure 2: Heat Map: evolution of the credit cycle ∗
∗ Estimates are obtained from Model 3. Red indicates a credit crisis phase, yellow indicates an intermediate
growth phase, and green indicates a credit expansion phase.
Figure 2 presents a graphical representation of the results obtained from the estimation of
Model 3. The representation of the results through a heat map is useful, among others, in the
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sense that it allows to see the different kinds of transition between states that these countries
have experienced. For example, during the 1970s a half of the sample experienced sudden stops
in the credit cycle, going from credit expansion to credit crisis phases (France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, UK and US). This phenomenon tended to be less usual in the next decades, in which
the landing after a credit boom was more gradual, entering into a period of intermediate growth
well before the credit crisis began (Germany 2001, Spain 1990, US 1987 and 2007). On the
other hand, credit crises in almost all cases ended with an intermediate growth phase, which is
consistent with the aforementioned idea that rapid recoveries are not usual in the credit cycle.
Table 4 provides the dating of credit crises episodes for each of the countries in our sample,
while Figure 3 shows the evolution of the smoothed probabilities of being in a credit crisis and in
a credit expansion phase for each country as determined by Model 3 together with the evolution
of the standardized series of real credit growth. Our model identifies various credit crisis phases
experienced in the past, which coincide with some of the periods of financial or banking crises
that the literature has previously recognized. For example, the credit crises identified for Spain
(1977), Sweden (1991) or Japan (middle 1990s) belong to the Big Five financial crises studied
by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). Our model also identifies some of the episodes of systemic and
non-systemic banking crisis proposed by Honohan and Laeven (2005), and Laeven et al. (2007).
Table 4: Dating of credit crisis peaks and troughs
COUNTRY Dating
Belgium 1981:I-1984:I, 1999:I-2005:II.
Canada 1962:IV-1963:III, 1982:I-1983:III, 2007:I-2008:II.
France 1970:IV, 1974:II-1974:III, 1977:I-1977:IV, 1993:I-1997:III.
Germany 1973:IV-1975:III, 2001:I -
Italy 1974:II-1975:I, 1976:II-1977:I, 1977:IV-1983:II, 1989:IV-1990:I 1993:I-1996:I.
Japan 1973:III-1974:IV, 1996:IV-1997:III ∗, 1998:I, 1998:III-2005:I
Netherlands 1969:I, 1980:I-1985:II, 2008:IV.
Spain 1977:I-1979:III ∗, 1983:IV-1985:II, 1992:I-1995:I, 2009:II -
Sweden 1985:I-1985:II, 1990:I-1993:II ∗, 1994:IV, 1995:II-1995:IV, 1999:III-1999:IV.
Switzerland 1990:III-1993:II, 2000:III-2000:IV, 2001:II-2002:III, 2008:I-2008:IV.
UK 1968:IV-1971:IV, 1974:II-1977:IV, 1979:III-1980:I.
US 1973:Iv-1975:III, 1979:III-1982:IV, 1989:IV-1993:I, 2008:II-2008:III, 2009:I -
The dating of the credit crisis episodes is based on the smoothed probabilities obtained from Model 3.
∗ denotes the “Big Five” financial crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008a.)
Italics type denotes systemic banking crisis episodes (Laeven and Valencia, 2008, and Honohan,
Patrick and Laeven, 2005).
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The results identify six economies which have shifted into phases of credit crisis since 2008
(Canada, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and United States). It is remarkable that
almost all of the countries considered in our study are identified as experiencing episodes of
restrictions in bank lending during the financial crisis of 2007-2009, either in form of a credit
crisis or a period of intermediate credit growth. This synchronization across countries seems
one of the most notable consequences of the last financial crisis with respect to bank credit. In
fact, some nations have experienced a change in the rate of growth of credit slightly different
from what has been observed during credit crises, shifting from periods of credit boom into
intermediate growth phases. Model 3 identifies eight of these economies as having experienced
a credit expansion phase during 2006 and a rapid shift into periods either of a credit crisis or
intermediate growth from the second quarter of 2008. These events could be linked to the view
proposed by Schularick and Taylor (2009), who demonstrate that credit growth is a predictor of
financial crises and suggest that such crises are“credit booms gone wrong”.
Analyzing the evolution of the smoothed probabilities obtained from the estimation of the
model, one can observe how the dynamics of credit summarize the developments that usually
take place around financial crisis episodes. For example, prior to the Nordic banking crisis, the
bank lending sectors of some Nordic countries experienced an important credit boom. Figure
3 plots, among others, the smoothed probabilities of being in a credit crisis and in a credit
expansion (right axis), together with the standardized quarterly growth rate of real credit (left
axis), for Sweden as an illustration of these developments. The smoothed probability of being
in an intermediate growth phase can be trivially inferred as a residual of the two depicted ones:
P (siτ = 2|ΩiT ) = 1− P (siτ = 1|ΩiT )− P (siτ = 3|ΩiT ), τ < T.
A period of rapid expansion in bank lending to the private sector is identified by our model
which started in 1985:III and ended five years later, in 1990:I, with a credit crunch that coincides
with the Nordic banking crisis.
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Our model identifies two large economies that have experienced a large recent phase of
contraction (or very moderate growth) in bank credit: Germany and Japan. In the case of
Germany, one can observe how after five years of credit expansion (1995-2000) the banking
sector entered into a period of restrictions in bank lending that emanated into a credit crunch.5
The smoothed probability of being in a credit crisis remains high for Germany basically until
the end of the sample period, and hence does not indicate that the country exited from a credit
crisis period. In many respects this development is reminiscent of the beginning of the banking
crisis in Japan in the early 1990s (Westermann, 2003). This country experienced a lending
boom in the late 1980s in parallel with the asset price bubble that burst in 1991. The effects
of the bubble’s collapse on bank lending are captured as an intermediate growth phase by our
model, followed by a credit crisis that started in 1997 after increased loan losses (charge-offs and
provisioning) that led to more bankruptcies in Japan (Nakaso, 2001). From 2005 onwards, our
model captures how this economy has entered into a period of intermediate credit growth, with
a modest improvement in bank lending. The magnitude of the problem clearly differs between
Germany and Japan, but development of credit extended by their banking sectors are rather
similar.
For various countries belonging to the euro area, our model captures asymmetric shocks in
their bank lending. The slowdown of credit in Germany coincided with rapid expansions in
Italy and Spain. These countries have experienced one of the largest booms in credit observed
over the sample period and, while it has ended with a severe credit crunch in Spain starting in
2009:II, the landing in Italy has been relatively less painful entering into an intermediate growth
phase from 2008:I onwards. Relative to the rest of euro area countries in our sample, i.e. France
and Belgium, the results suggest that the effects of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 have been
relatively small compared to countries like Spain or United States, since both of them remain
in a period of intermediate credit growth.
Table 5 presents the recovered values for the conditional means and standard deviations
implied by the model for each of the countries together with the number of credit crisis phases
identified for each of the countries. The implied conditional moments can be easily recovered
given the estimates of αi and σi presented in Table 1, together with the parameter estimates of
5 Nehls and Schmidt (2003) find evidence of a credit crunch starting in Germany in 2001.
B
A
N
C
O
 D
E
 E
S
P
A
Ñ
A
28
D
O
C
U
M
E
N
T
O
 D
E
 T
R
A
B
A
JO
 N
.º 1113
B
A
N
C
O
 D
E
 E
S
P
A
Ñ
A
29
D
O
C
U
M
E
N
T
O
 D
E
 T
R
A
B
A
JO
 N
.º 1113
B
A
N
C
O
 D
E
 E
S
P
A
Ñ
A
30
D
O
C
U
M
E
N
T
O
 D
E
 T
R
A
B
A
JO
 N
.º 1113
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 31 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1113
Model 3 presented in Table 2. Credit expansion implies an expected mean growth rate of private
sector credit over 3% for some countries (Canada, Netherlands and Spain), while for countries
like Germany, Italy and Switzerland it implies values close to 2%. Expected mean growth rates
in the intermediate growth state range from 0.46% (Sweden) to 1.72% (Netherlands). Relative
to credit crises, we can observe that the expected mean growth rates of private sector credit are
negative for almost all countries with Belgium, Sweden and United Kingdom at the lower tail
of the distribution. Advanced economies have experienced an average of three complete phases
of credit crisis over the sample period. However, the number of crises varies significantly across
countries, with some experiencing only two crisis phases (Belgium and Germany) and others
four or more (France and Italy).
Table 5: Conditional moments
(quarterly percentage rates)
ω(1) ω(2) ω(3) σ # Crises
Belgium 2.95 1.00 -1.01 1.36 2
Canada 3.05 1.08 -0.96 1.38 4
France 2.81 1.01 -0.86 1.27 4
Germany 1.81 0.89 -0.06 0.64 2
Italy 2.00 0.66 -0.72 0.93 5
Japan 2.69 0.93 -0.90 1.23 4
Netherlands 3.14 1.72 0.24 1.00 3
Spain 3.17 1.27 -0.69 1.33 4
Sweden 2.89 0.46 -2.05 1.70 5
Switzerland 1.88 0.68 -0.57 0.85 4
UK 2.74 0.69 -1.43 1.44 3
US 2.02 0.60 -0.87 1.00 5
Average 2.60 0.92 -0.82 1.18 3.75
S.D. 0.52 0.34 0.58 0.30 1.05
Note: conditional means and variances recovered from the esti-
mates of Model 3. Average: mean over the 12 countries. S.D.:
standard deviation. # Crises: number of credit crisis phases
identified within each country.
4.3 Relationship between bank credit and the business cycle
One can also analyze the different links that exist between the evolution of bank credit and the
business cycle. As an example, Figure 4 plots the smoothed probabilities of being in a credit
crisis state (top panel) and credit expansion state (bottom panel) for the case of United States
together with the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dating of the US recessions.
There is a close relationship between the evolution of the real economy and developments
in the banking sector linked with real credit growth. Four of the recessions in the last 50 years
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Figure 4: Comparison: evolution of bank lending vs. NBER recessions
(shaded areas denote NBER recessions)
−− Smoothed probability of being in a credit crisis
− − Smoothed probability of being in a credit expansion
have been accompanied by episodes of a credit crunch, which correspond to the periods 1973-
1975, 1979-1982, 1989-1993, and from 2008 to the end of the sample. Relative to the recessions
experienced in early 1970s and in 2001 one can observe that, although the model does not assign
the credit crisis state, there is an increase in the probability of being in that state, in fact the
model identifies the slowdown in real credit as episodes of intermediate growth.
In principle, effects can flow from economic conditions to bank lending decisions and vicev-
ersa. The recessions of the 1980s and the 1990s started after the beginning of their respective
credit crisis, and hence possibly the credit growth slowdown drove the shift in the real economy.
If banks are an important source of funds for consumers and firms, an specific shock that af-
fects bank lending may reduce borrowers’ ability to invest or consume, leading to a slowdown in
economic activity (“bank lending channel”). On the other hand, we find that, for the recessions
experienced in the early 1970s and the current financial crisis, real credit growth displays a
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 33 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1113
lagged behavior with one and two quarters of difference, respectively, compared to the begin-
ning of the recession. In this context, the worsening in business conditions possibly increases
the risk of many potential borrowers reducing their creditworthiness and making banks more
conservative (“credit risk channel”).
5 Constructing synthetic indicators of global credit stance
In this section we present an application of the results obtained from the estimation of the model.
First, we present a synthetic indicator of the global credit stance that includes information on
the evolution of bank lending in each of the advanced economies in our sample. Then, we study
the degree of synchronization that exists between these economies and the relationship of our
indicators of credit crisis with a variable that reflects the change in credit standards applied by
the bank lending sector.
One of the advantages of working with a panel of countries is that we are able to analyze
the credit cycle for different regions that include multiple countries simultaneously. We propose
the construction of an indicator of the probability of being in a credit crisis for a multiple set of
countries as an average of the smoothed probabilities of being in a credit crisis (P (sit = 3|ΩiT ))
obtained from the estimation of Model 3.
Figure 5 plots the proposed indicator, together with the contribution of the countries from
different areas: United States, Japan, Europe I (countries belonging to the euro area) and
Europe II (European countries that do not belong to the euro area).6 This indicator could be
interpreted as a measure of the evolution of the credit cycle at a global level for the advanced
economies. We can observe a systematic cyclical pattern in the evolution of bank credit for these
developed economies during the last forty years, with five episodes of global restrictions in real
credit growth: 1974-75 (oil crisis), 1980-82 (second oil crisis), 1991-93 (Nordic crisis and savings
and loans crisis in the United States), 2001-02 (end of the dot-com bubble) and from 2008 to
the end of the sample (financial crisis).
The proposed indicator is not able to fully capture the degree of synchronization between
the credit cycles of these countries. As we remarked in the previous section, maybe the most
remarkable consequence of the current financial crisis over the evolution of lending in advanced
economies is the synchronization in the slowdown in credit growth, with a joint shift of these
economies from periods of expansion into periods of intermediate growth or credit crisis episodes.
6 The proposed indicator excludes data from Canada since data for this country was only available until
2008:IV.
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Figure 5: Synthetic indicator of global credit stance
- Synthetic indicator
Contributions: - - United States - Europe I (euro) -.- Europe II (non-euro) .. Japan
Europe I (euro countries): Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Spain.
Europe II (non-euro countries): Sweden, Switzerland and UK.
Figure 6 plots the proportion of countries being in a credit crisis (sit = 3) and the proportion of
countries being either in a credit crisis or in a period of intermediate credit growth (sit = 2, 3).
The shadow areas correspond to those credit crisis episodes that the model identifies for the
United States, which has been at the center of synchronous credit crises in almost all of the
phases of global restrictions in bank lending. This country seems to lead the evolution of the
credit cycle at the international level, experiencing credit crisis phases earlier and recovering
the pace of credit growth when the rest of the economies have just entered in periods of bank
lending restrictions.
It may be interesting to link the results to those obtained from bank lending surveys. The use
of these surveys has become popular among analysts of bank credit developments. For example,
Lown and Morgan (2006) find that credit standards strongly dominate loan rates in explaining
variation in business loans. In Figure 7 we plot the evolution of the probability of being in a
credit crisis for the United States (top panel) and the evolution of the synthetic indicator for
the euro area (bottom panel) together with a measure coming from bank lending surveys that
represents the change in credit standards required by commercial banks. For the case of United
States, this variable is provided on a quarterly basis by the Federal Reserve (collected from the
Federal Loan Officer Opinion Survey) as the net percentage of respondents reporting tightening
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 35 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1113
Figure 6: synchronization of the cycle
(shaded areas denote credit crisis episodes identified for the US)
- % of countries in intermediate growth/credit crisis - - % of countries in a credit crisis
credit standards over the last three months. Importantly, the behavior of this variable leads the
evolution of real credit over the full sample period: For example, in 2006 we find an increase in
the percentage of banks reporting a tightening of credit standards while the slowdown in real
credit growth started in 2007, one year later.
In the bottom panel of Figure 7, we plot the synthetic indicator for the euro area countries
(constructed as an average of their smoothed probabilities of being in a credit crisis) together
with the evolution of the variable for credit standards, which comes from the Euro Area Bank
Lending Survey (provided by the European Central Bank on a quarterly basis). Although much
less definitive due to the heterogeneity present among euro area countries, we observe the same
qualitative pattern as in the case of United States: The change in this variable leads the evolution
of real credit for the group of countries belonging to the euro area. For example, in the second
quarter of 2007 euro-banks were already tightening their lending standards while the evolution
of real credit growth did not start to moderate until the first quarter of 2008 (the moment at
which the indicator reflects an increase in the probability of being in a credit crisis for the euro
area).
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Figure 7: Probability of being in a credit crisis vs. credit standards United States
- US smoothed probability of being in credit crisis (left axis) - - US credit standards (right axis)
(no standards were reported between 1984-1990)
Euro area
- Eurozone indicator (left axis) - - Euro-credit standards (right axis)
Euro area countries in our sample: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Spain.
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6 Conclusions
We have analyzed the credit cycle for a sample of twelve developed countries over the last fifty
years. In our preferred specification, the evolution of the cyclical component of credit dynamics is
characterized as a three-state Markov-switching model in the same fashion as Ceron and Suarez
(2006). Under this proposal the estimation method proposed by Hamilton (1989) is adapted in
order to take advantage of the joint estimation of the model, assuming that the evolution of the
standardized series of real bank credit to the private sector of each country is an independent
realization of the same Markov process.
Under this specification, the development of bank credit of a given country can be in either
a “credit expansion”, an “intermediate growth”, or a “credit crisis” phase. Credit crisis phases
have a mean growth rate of −121.2% of one standard deviation of the original series and they
are found to be the least persistent state, with an expected duration of 7.4 quarters and an
unconditional probability of 18.1%. Credit expansion phases have a mean growth rate of 80.8%
and they last around 13.0 quarters with an unconditional probability of 37.1%. Intermediate
growth phases have a mean growth rate of −18.5% of one standard deviation of the original series
with and expected duration of 7.4 quarters and a frequency of 44.8%. On average, advanced
economies have experienced three complete phases of credit crises over the sample period.
We find that six of the countries have experienced a credit crisis after the beginning financial
crisis of 2007-2009 (Canada, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and US). By the end
of the sample, three of these countries were still in a credit crisis episode (2010:I for Germany
and Spain; and 2009:IV for United States). We also find that there exists a synchronization
between the credit cycles of these economies, which have experienced five episodes of synchronous
restrictions in bank lending during the last forty years: 1974-75 (oil crisis), 1980-82 (second oil
crisis), 1991-93 (Nordic crisis and savings and loans crisis in the United States), 2001-02 (end
of the dot-com bubble) and from 2008 to the end of the sample (financial crisis). Comparisons
between the evolution of the smoothed probability of being in a credit crisis and the credit
standards required by commercial banks suggest that the latter lead the credit cycle in the case
of the United States (and also in the case of the Euro Area, although the result is much less
definitive due to the heterogeneity present among euro area countries), which coincides with the
results found previously in the literature (Lown and Morgan, 2006) that remark the explanatory
power of this variable in the evolution of bank lending.
Relative to the dating obtained, our model identifies more credit crisis episodes than are
typically identified with less formal techniques. Our episodes include some periods of financial
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or banking crises that the literature has previously recognized. For example, we find credit crises
for Spain (1977), Sweden (1991) or Japan (middle 1990s) which belong to the Big Five financial
crises studied by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). Our model also identifies some of the episodes of
systemic and non-systemic banking crisis proposed by Honohan and Laeven (2005) and Laeven
et al. (2007).
This paper has described the evolution of the credit cycle. Once we are able to identify the
swings in credit the next step is to understand what are the forces that cause these swings, which
is left for future research. Some ways for future research may be the inclusion of time-varying
transition probabilities in order to test which variables lead the evolution of the credit cycle, and
allow for interdependencies between the dynamics of credit for these economies in the estimation
process as a way to describe better the synchronization found in our study.
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Appendix
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics by decade
(quarterly percentage rates)
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s All
Belgium 3.17 2.06 1.20 0.47 0.03 1.37
Canada 2.24 2.54 0.83 0.75 0.84 1.45
France 2.90 1.27 1.16 0.50 0.95 1.34
Germany 2.08 1.25 0.77 1.21 0.10 1.07
Italy 0.00 0.74 0.66 0.88 1.37 0.91
Japan 2.78 1.44 1.86 0.59 -0.33 1.26
Netherlands 2.92 2.64 0.72 1.88 1.82 1.98
Spain 0.00 1.14 1.20 1.11 2.98 1.62
Sweden 1.42 0.90 1.27 -0.54 1.59 0.92
Switzerland 1.57 0.91 1.40 0.33 0.59 0.90
UK 0.37 -0.04 2.27 0.74 1.97 1.08
US 1.78 0.95 0.65 0.20 0.75 0.87
Average 1.77 1.32 1.17 0.68 1.06 1.23
S.D. 1.14 0.77 0.50 0.60 0.94 0.34
Average: mean over the 12 countries. S.D.: standard deviation.
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